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This research is composed of two essays, both using economic approaches to
evaluate land conservation in the United States. Essay I uses econometric methods to
evaluate public lands, and Essay II uses New Institutional Economics to gain insight into
private land conservation.
Essay I is titled "The Relationship Between Public Conservation Lands and
Tourism Employment in the United States." This research examines the relationship
between public conservation lands and the importance of tourism in United States
counties. A spatial error model is used on three categories of conservation land: general
public land, recreational land, and wilderness areas. A positive, significant relationship
was shown between all three categories of conservation lands and the proportion of
county employment in tourism. This research suggests that land conservation and
economic development are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and that a stronger
relationship between the tourism industry and conservation groups might be beneficial.

Essay II is titled, "Institutional Analysis Applied to United States Private Land
Conservation." United States land conservation, once dominated by government
agencies, is increasingly performed by land trusts and other private conservation groups.
This activity often takes the form of a land trusts collaborating with private landowners in
enacting conservation easements. The rapid growth in private land conservation can be
explained in part with insights from institutional analysis. One branch of institutional
analysis looks at how institutions, or the 'rules of the game', influence how organizations
form and in turn push for institutional change. This can be used to explain how United
States tax laws and conservation easement enabling statutes interacted with land trusts
and other conservation organizations to enable the rapid growth of private land
conservation. This research contains insights into organizational and institutional issues
that may be useful to ecosystem managers and conservation planners.
A multidisciplinary approach is increasingly emphasized as necessary to the
future of ecosystem and biodiversity conservation. This research contributes insights
from economics that can be used in this multidisciplinary effort.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Economic theories and applications are gaining ground in government land
management agencies, conservation biology research, and conservation organizations.
There is increasing awareness of concepts such as the opportunity cost of conservation
(Polasky and Vossler, 2006; Shogren et al., 1999), the market failures challenging the
provision of conservation land (Asafu-adjaye, 2003; Albers and Ando, 2003), the
institutional issues involved in ecosystem management (Imperial, 1999; Grumbine,
1997), and economic benefits associated with direct, sustainable uses of natural
ecosystems (Pearce and Moran, 1994; Jenkins et al., 2004). Among those scientists and
practitioners striving to conserve the world's biodiversity and ecosystem sustainability,
the knowledge that various human economic activities are the greatest threats to these
systems is widespread and accepted (Czech et al., 2000). As such, economic research
cannot be excluded from the table, and indeed is being embraced in new concepts such as
"adaptive management", "ecosystem management" and "co-management" of natural
resources (Keough and Blahna, 2006; Imperial, 1999; Grumbine, 1997, among others).
Economics is evolving from being seen as "the problem" to part of the solution, and
multi-disciplinary research is shaping the future of ecosystem management and
biodiversity conservation. This study contributes to the application of economic analysis
in land protection in two ways.
Essay I employs econometric analysis to reveal a relationship between a direct use
of public conservation lands by tourists, and its impact on the local economy. Essay II
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employs institutional economic analysis to assist in explaining the rapidly growing
private conservation movement.
Essay I is titled "The Relationship between Public Conservation Land and
Tourism Employment in the United States." This research looks at public lands in the
United States, and a direct economic activity—tourism—that can be associated with these
lands. Many of the benefits of conservation lands are public goods—with their infeasible
exclusion and non-rival use. Difficulties of market provision of public goods have led to
a system of government provision of conservation lands in the United States. However,
federal government funding for land conservation has stagnated in recent years (Jenkins
et al., 2004). The widespread data availability on public lands at the federal, state and
local levels make it possible to analyze economic benefits from these lands using
statistical methods. This research examines the relationship between tourism
employment and public conservation lands and in United States counties. A spatial error
model is used on three categories of conservation land: general public land, recreational
land, and wilderness areas. A positive, significant relationship is shown between the
proportion of employees in tourism and all three categories of conservation lands. This
research suggests land conservation and economic development are not necessarily
mutually exclusive, and a stronger relationship between the tourism industry and
conservation groups might be beneficial.
Essay II is titled "Institutional Analysis Applied to Private Land Conservation in
the United States". Much of the world's biodiversity and intact ecosystems exist on
privately owned land (Merenlender et al., 2004). Many conservation scientists and land
managers are recognizing the need to include private lands in concert with public

2

reserves in conservation planning (Jenkins et al., 2004). There has been a surge in private
land conservation in the United States beginning in the 1970s and continuing today (Land
Trust Alliance, 2005) that challenges old notions that only the government can protect
landscapes. This activity often takes the form of land trusts collaborating with private
landowners in enacting conservation easements. The rapid growth in private land
conservation can be explained in part with insights from the new institutional economics.
A branch of new institutional economics looks at how institutions, or the 'rules of the
game', influence how organizations form and in turn push for institutional change. This
can be used to explain how United States tax laws and conservation easement enabling
statutes interacted with land trusts and other conservation organizations to enable the
rapid growth of private land conservation.
The order of the two essays reflects the evolution of land conservation in the
United States from public to private—first the impact of public lands on the economy is
considered, then an analysis of the factors influencing the new wave of private
conservation is performed. Today, conservation planners and ecosystem managers are
increasingly looking across organizational boundaries, embracing interdisciplinary
research, and including public and private lands in eco-system based plans (Grumbine,
1997; Keough and Blahna, 2006; Imperial, 1999). This research hopes to add to the
knowledge that helps conservation practitioners better integrate economics and ecology
in designing plans that will be effective in meeting conservation goals as well as fostering
broader based support and contributing to society's economic goals.
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Chapter 2
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PUBLIC CONSERVATION LANDS AND
TOURISM EMPLOYMENT IN UNITED STATES COUNTIES

Introduction
Human-caused destruction of biodiversity worldwide is one of the major
environmental problems of our time (Asafu-adjaye, 2003; Wilson, 1992; Pearce and
Moran, 1994). Unlike some environmental problems, biodiversity loss is irreversible.
Once a species is lost, it cannot be brought back by technology or an increased public
awareness (Asafu-Adjaye, 2003). The crisis of extinctions, as many have called it, is an
urgent global problem.
Most of the animals and plants endangered today are at risk due to human causes
(Wilcove et al., 1998). Habitat loss is the single greatest threat to biodiversity (Wilcove
et al., 1998; Czech et al., 2000; Wilson, 1992). Conversion of natural ecosystems for
human economic uses such as urbanization, agriculture, road construction, and energy
extraction alter or destroy the habitats of many species (Czech et al., 2000; Wilcove et al.,
1998). As human populations and economies grow, the conversion of ecosystems
accelerates and biodiversity declines (Asafu-Adjaye, 2003).
Calls for more land protection are widespread among conservation biologists and
other scientists studying biodiversity loss. Soule and Sanjayan (1998) state that the target
of 10 percent of global land protection set by many conservation organizations is
inadequate to stem the loss of biodiversity. They emphasize the need for formal
protection of ecosystems, particularly in areas with high economic value, to ensure
biodiversity will be maintained. Research by Asafu-Adjaye (2003) of 100 countries
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shows a positive relationship between the percentage of protected land area and
biodiversity levels. Protected areas as the percentage of total land area has been
identified as an indicator of biodiversity (MacGillivray, 1993). Conserving habitat is
central to conserving biodiversity, and land-use decisions are of critical importance to
biodiversity conservation (Polasky and Vossler, 2006).
Land protection can often be controversial, as many fear that taking land out of
certain economic uses will lead to local economic decline (Duffy-Deno, 2000).
Accounting for the economic impact of biodiversity conservation projects are critical to
their success (Czech et al., 2000). On the flip side, if economic values of biodiversity are
not accounted for in decision making, socially optimal land-use decisions may not be
reached, and biodiversity will be inadequately protected (Pearce and Moran, 1994).
Tourism has been identified as a direct use of biodiversity that can support its
conservation (Pearce and Moran, 1994). This study looks at tourism and how its
importance in the local economy may be enhanced by public land protection.

Land Protection and Local Economies
There is a general perception that land conservation comes at an economic cost,
and that communities must choose between jobs and the environment. Regions that
depend on natural resources extraction for their economies are concerned that excluding
lands from these activities will result in widespread job loss, out-migration, and economic
decline (Power, 1996).
Recent research has examined these concerns and uncovered empirical evidence
demonstrating conservation lands do not necessarily result in economic decline, and
sometimes lead to economic growth in a region (Kerkvliet et al., forthcoming; Lewis et
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al., 2002; Duffy-Deno, 1998). Duffy-Deno (1998) shows wilderness designation on
federal lands formerly open for resource extraction had no effect on population density or
employment growth in the intermountain Western United States. These results held true
for even the areas most dependent on resource extraction. Lewis et al. (2002) examine
the United States' Northern Forest region and the impact of public conservation land on
net migration and employment growth. They found lands designated for preservation had
no effect, while multiple-use conservation lands had a direct positive association with net
migration and an indirect positive association with employment growth. Kerkvliet et al.
(forthcoming) find that the Northwest Forest Plan, which closes off much of the federal
lands in the Pacific Northwest United States to logging to protect the endangered
Northern Spotted Owl, had a positive correlation with net migration and employment.
Kerkvliet et al. (forthcoming) and Lewis et al. (2002) speculate that the positive
association of conservation with net migration is due to the role of conservation land as a
natural amenity. Natural amenities are environmental features that may attract people to
recreate, retire or relocate to an area. Examples are a pleasant climate, varied
topography, forests and water area. Natural amenities are the subject of a vast body of
recent literature, and are shown to have positive associations with population and
employment growth in rural areas (McGranahan, 1999; English et al., 2000).

Firms

may relocate to amenity-rich areas to take advantage of the influx of often well-educated
migrants (Kwang-Koo et al., 2005). Deller et al. (2001) categorized amenities into land,
recreational infrastructure, climate, water and winter and found all categories had a
significant and positive correlation with employment growth. They surmised that the
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positive impact of the land amenities may be due to tourism in areas with publicly owned
land and mountainous areas.

Role of Tourism
This research investigates linkages between land conservation and tourism
employment. If it is shown that land conservation can lead to economic growth in the
form of tourism, then regional planners, the tourism industry, and policy makers may
promote conservation as a contributor to economic development. Increased land
protection on local scales could have global implications for biodiversity conservation
(MacGillivray, 1993; Asafu-adjaye, 2003; Soule and Sanjayan, 1998).
Tourism is one of the largest economic sectors in the world, employing millions
of people and supporting small businesses in some of the most rural regions (World
Travel and Tourism Council, 2002). Nature-based tourism, defined as traveling to see the
natural areas of a region, is one of the fastest growing tourism markets (Wells, 1997).
Nature based tourism has the potential to provide economic incentives for and thus
contribute to biodiversity conservation (Wells, 1997). Marcouiller (1998) identifies the
role of environmental resources as a primary input in tourism's production function.
Public lands function as a public good, providing this input to tourism at no cost to firms.
The recreational values of natural ecosystems are not set in a market, and thus harder to
measure than tradable goods such as timber (Marcouiller, 1998).
Conservation groups often use the economic gains of tourism as justification for
setting aside more public lands and closing off existing lands to extractive activities
(Buckley, 1999). However, more benefit could be gained if tourism firms joined with
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these groups as well as government agencies to push for more conservation lands
(Buckley, 1999; Marcouiller, 1998).
The role of the tourism industry in land conservation initiatives has been minor.
Recognition and support from the tourism industry could have strong implications for
land protection and biodiversity conservation. This research investigates the direct link
between public conservation lands and tourism employment.

We hypothesize that

public conservation land has a positive and significant relationship with tourism
employment.

Methods
Though not all of the landscapes protecting biodiversity are accessible or
attractive to visitors, many public lands in the United States are available for recreation
and serve to attract tourists. Conservation lands often enhance the scenic quality of an
area which may also attract individuals who do not directly use these areas. Tourism
firms often locate near public conservation lands to attract their visitors (Deller et al.,
2001; Marcouiller, 1998). We expect the areas near conservation lands to have abundant
employment opportunities in tourism.
This study conducts a county-level analysis of the effects of public conservation
lands on tourism employment in the United States. Consider the following linear model,
which specifies tourism employment as a function of conservation lands and other
variables:
(1)

TEj = p0 + PiCLi + p2NAi + p3AQ + p4STs + £i
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i = 1,....,3059, where p are vectors of unobserved parameters to be estimated and Ejis the
error term assumed to be normally distributed with a zero mean.
The dependent variable, tourism employment (TE), is the percentage of a
county's employed population that works in a tourism industry. Tourism as an industry is
notoriously difficult to define (Marcouiller et al., 2004; English et al., 2000; Johnson and
Thomas, 2001). This study uses the IMPLAN Resource Dependence Typology variables
developed by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) Economic Research Service
(ERS). Data were collected from the National Outdoor Recreation Supply Information
System (NORSIS), compiled in 1997 by the US Forest Service. We use the number of
jobs in the following Resource Dependence (RD) categories: eating and drinking, hotels
and accommodations, and tourism services.
This categorization of the tourism industry is similar to other studies (Marcouiller
et al. 2004; English et al., 2000; Johnson and Thomas, 2001) with some studies including
retail services and transportation. Such a categorization is an imperfect measure of
tourism, due to spending by residents and business travelers in these industries.
However, employment data for these economic sectors are widely available, and methods
to separate tourist expenditures in these sectors from spending by residents and business
travelers are in their infancy and not available at the U. S. county level.
Number of jobs in these three categories are added and divided by the total
employed population to get a percentage employed in tourism. A percentage is desirable
in this circumstance as United States counties vary tremendously in population and size.
TE represents each county's dependence on tourism. See Figure 1 for the distribution of
tourism employment across the United States.
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Only public conservation lands were included in the Conservation Land (CL)
independent variables, due to data availability. Public lands are an imperfect measure of
biodiversity conservation for a few reasons. United States public lands are not optimally
designed for biodiversity conservation (Grumbine, 1990). Conservation on private lands
play an important and ever-increasing role, but data on land conserved by private
landowners and private conservation groups are scattered and difficult to obtain
(Merenlender, 2003). Public conservation land data are widely available at the county
level, and thus serves as a proxy for biodiversity conservation in this study.
CL is the proportion of total county acres that are in conservation status, due to
the largely different sizes of United States counties. CL variables were obtained from
NORSIS. Equation 1 will be estimated in three separate regressions using three different
categories of conservation land, similarly to Lewis et al. (2002) which looked at the
effects of preservationist and multiple-use lands together and separately. A priori, all
conservation lands are expected to have a positive, significant relationship with tourism
employment.
The first category, General Public lands (GP), includes federal, state, county and
municipal lands. This classification is broad, including lands of unknown management
status at the state, county and municipal level. Federal lands include lands owned by:
National Forest Service (USDAFS), US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), US Army
Corps of Engineers (COE), Bureau of Reclamation, National Park Service (NPS), and
Bureau of Land Management (BLM). Lands owned by the U.S. military are not included
in this analysis. Many of these lands include some resource extractive activities such as
logging and ranching.

This most inclusive category represents public lands protected
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Figure 1. Tourism Employment

Figure 2. General Public Lands
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Figure 3. Recreational Lands
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Figure 4. Wilderness Area
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from development, though not necessarily from some economic activities. See Figure 2
for the distribution of General Public Lands.
Some of the lands known to be managed for recreation are represented in the
variable, recreation (REC). Though not all lands that allow recreation are included, the
land that is included is known to have recreation and public access as central to their
management. See Figure 3 for a distribution of Recreational lands. Wilderness is a
variable that includes lands in the National Wilderness Preservation System (NWPS).
Such areas are road-less and off-limits to motorized activities. Often wilderness areas are
nested within other multiple-use lands such as National Forests. See Figure 4 for a
distribution of wilderness areas.
See Table 1 for a description of variables.
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Variable
Tourism
Employment
(TE)
General
Public Land
(GP)

Recreational
Land (REC)
Wilderness
Area
(WILD)
Coast
Water
January sun
July temp
July humid
Plains
Tablelands
Plains/Hills
Open hills
and
mountains
Hills and
Mountains
Pop density
P/MSA

Airport

Interstate
State

Table 1. The Variables
Description

Mean

% of employed population in lodging,
eating/drinking and tourism services

8.1

% acres in federal, state, county, and
13.42
municipal ownership, including; Bureau of
Reclamation, National Park Service, Army
Corps of Engineers, USDA Forest Service, US
Fish & Wildlife Service, Bureau of Land
Management, Natural Resources Inventory
(County, Municipal and State owned land)
% acres in National Park Service, State Parks, 1.5
and USFish and Wildlife recreational lands
% acres in National Wilderness Preservation
.78
System

Standard
Deviation
6.96

19.36

6.14
4.17

Dummy (1 = coastal county, 0 = no)
% water area
Mean hours of January sunlight
Mean July temperature
Mean July relative humidity
Dummy (1 = topography is plains, 0= no)
Dummy (1 = topography is tablelands, 0= no)
Dummy (1 = topography is plains with hills, 0
= no)
Dummy (1 = topography is open hills and
mountains, 0 = no)

.10
4.56
151.49
75.84
56.02
0.484
0.064
0.072

0.30
11.22
33.27
5.36
14.62
0.5
0.25
0.26

0.239

0.43

Dummy (1 = topography is hills and
mountains, 0 = no)
Population density in persons per square mile
Distance to the nearest Metropolitan
Statistical Area or Primary Metropolitan
Statistical Area, in Kilometers
Dummy (1 = county contains an airport with a
minimum of 100,000 enplanement per year, 0
= no)
Dummy (1 = interstate highway intersects
county border, 0 = no)
Dummy for each State (ex. 1 = Vermont 0 =
no)

0.141

0.35

197.8
43.65

1412
53.27

0.062

0.242

0.438

0.496

NA

NA
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Several natural amenities (NA) are expected to be positively associated with
tourism employment. These data were gathered from McGranahan (1999). These are
considered desirable amenities that positively influence recreation, retirement decisions,
and other types of migration decisions (Marcouiller et al. 2004; Deller et al, 2001;
McGranahan, 1999). These amenities include: water (lakes and rivers), coastline, varied
topography (ie. mountains), and climate considered pleasant (sunny winters, temperate
summers). See Table 1 for NA variable descriptions (the variables coast, water, January
sun, July humid, July temp, and the five topography codes are considered part of NA).
While conservation lands and amenities are local characteristics that are desirable
to tourists, it is also important to control for the potential source of tourists in the region
and the ease of access. Urban areas may serve as a source of tourist visitors to
conservation lands in more rural areas. Population density (Pop density) and distance to
the nearest Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area or Metropolitan Statistical Area
(P/MSA) were included to capture effects of population on tourism employment and
employment in general. Accessibility is also a factor in determining the tourism in an
area. Larger airports (Airport) and interstate highways (Interstate) are hypothesized to be
positively associated with tourism employment. The variables of Pop density, P/MSA,
Airport and Interstate are seen as indicators of accessibility (AC).
Variations may exist among states that influence a county's tourism. These could
include a state's marketing efforts for tourists, meals and lodging taxes, or the image and
allure of the state to outsiders. These unmeasured variables are controlled for by the
inclusion of state level dummy variables (ST).
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The following models were estimated for our 3 categorizations of CL:
(2)

TE, = p0 + PiGPi + p2NAi + p3AC, + p4STi + £j

(3)

TEj = p0 + PiRECj + p2NAj + p3ACj + p4STi + 8j

(4)

TEj = p0 + piWILDj + p2NA, + p3ACi + p4STj + Si
Equations 2-4 are used to examine the effects of conservation lands on tourism

employment. The possibility exists that conservation lands in one county may affect
tourism employment in adjacent counties (a potential for spatial autocorrelation). Often
there are "gateway communities" that serve visitors to parks that may be located in
separate counties. Other natural amenities such as climate and topography exhibit
clustering in space (Kwang-Koo et al., 2005). Many natural amenity variables are
included in these models, however, there may be omitted variables that are spatially
correlated. These concerns led to a consideration of the possibility of spatial dependence.
Diagnostic tests for spatial autocorrelation of the residuals were performed on
Equations 2-4. When ordinary least squares (OLS) is used on a model with spatially
correlated residuals, inefficient parameter estimates may result, and standard errors may
be underestimated. Mapping of residuals indicated a possibility for spatial
autocorrelation. Moran's I values for all three models (equations 2-4) were positive and
significant, indicating spatial dependence. Lagrange Multiplier test statistics indicated
that a spatial error model (SEM) was an appropriate alternative model. Multiple spatial
weight matrices were tested in the above mentioned tests. A first-order Queen contiguity
spatial weight matrix was chosen as most appropriate, which defines counties as
neighbors if they share common boundaries or vertices.
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Once the SEM was chosen, equations 2-4 were estimated with the following error
term:

(5)

n
& = pYs Wij^ + jUi
7=1

where s is a (nxl) vector of spatially correlated error terms, p. is a vector (nxl) of
uncorrelated error terms, and p is a (nxl) of the spatially correlated coefficient to be
estimated. W is a nxn spatial weights matrix (wy) that defines a set of neighbors for each
observation. Since a first order queen contiguity matrix was chosen, county j is assigned
a 1 when county j is defined as a neighbor to county i, (ie. it shares a boundry or vertex
with county i) and zero otherwise. The diagonal elements of the matrix are zero (wii=0)
as a county is not a neighbor to itself.
Log likelihood, Akaike info, and Schwarz criterion, all goodness of fit measures,
were used to compare OLS with SEM models for equations 2-4. All three goodness of fit
measures showed improvements from OLS to SEM models for all three equations.
Therefore, a SEM was chosen as the most appropriate model.

Results
Table 2 shows SEM regression results for equations 2-4. The coast and water
variables performed as expected, both having a positive and significant relationship with
tourism employment in all three models. Of the topography categories, only hills and
mountains had a significant effect, which turned out to be positive as expected. Mean
sun in January does not have a significant relationship with tourism employment, while
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Table 2. Spatial Error Model Results on 3 Types of Conservation Lands
Variable
Constant

Estimated Coefficients
47.522***
55.65***
(11.52)
(13.221)

General Public Land

0.089***
(10.63)

NA

NA

Recreation Land

NA

0.137***
(7.103)

NA

Wilderness

NA

NA

0.38***
(13.218)

Coast

1.165**
(1.965)

1.074*
(1.762)

1.432**
(2.448)

Water

0.087***
(7.04)

0.083***
(6.51)

0.089***
(7.365)

Tablelands

-0.074
(-0.149)

-0.232
(-0.456)

-0.07
(-0.142)

Plains and Hills

-1.119**
(-2.211)

-0.761
(-1.472)

-0.6
(-1.205)

Open Hills/Mountains

0.173
(-0.512)

0.147
(0.423)

0.178
(0.54)

Hills and Mountains

1.450***
(3.074)

2 377***
(4.987)

1.686***
(3.687)

January Sun

-0.008
(-1.049)

-0.012
(-1.395)

-0.011
(-1.439)

July Temp

-0.457***
(-9.762)

-0.547***
(-11.493)

-0.466***
(-10.151)

July Humidity

-0.131***
(-5.835)

-0.146***
(-6.309)

-0.131***
(-5.956)
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48.956***
(12.137)

Table 2. Continued
P/MSA
Pop Density
Interstate
Airport

Rho
Log likelihood

0.004
(1.399)

0.008**
(2.552)

0.007**
(2.552)

0.00009
(-1.084)
1.554***
(6.588)
2.87***
(6.386)

0.00003
(-0.317)
1.605***
(6.699)
2.821***
(6.227)

-0.00003
(-0.308)
1.612***
(6.908)
2.645***
(5.932)

0.141***
(4.802)
-9706.78

0.191***
(6.66)
-9735.53

0.127***
(4.304)
-9678.32

Number of Observations 3058
Dummy variables included for each state.
Figures in parenthesis are t-statistics. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10
percent levels.

July temperature and humidity both had significant negative relationships. For example,
the first regression result shows a coefficient of -0.46 for July temp. Thus, a one degree
increase in July temp from its mean of 75.8 to 76.8, is associated with a decrease of
percentage of employment in tourism of about one-half a percentage point. Results on
natural amenity variables, as expected, show that areas with pleasant summer weather,
coastline, lakes and rivers, and mountainous terrain, are more likely to have tourism as an
important aspect of their economy.
Population density proved insignificant in all 3 models, while distance to the
nearest PMSA or MSA was significant and positive. This distance is measured in
kilometers, so though the coefficients seem small, this can be expected as they represent
the association of a one kilometer increase with a change in the proportion of tourism
employment. The presences of a sizable airport and an interstate highway, representing
accessibility to tourists, proved positive and significant. Rho is our spatially
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autoregressive coefficient, and is positive and highly significant in all three models. Rho
is showing positive correlation of residuals across
space, and the spatial error model appears to be controlling for omitted variables that are
clustered in space. Possibilities include natural amenities not included in the models that
are naturally clustered in space. It is also possible rho is controlling for conservation
lands in one county influencing surrounding counties' tourism employment.
The independent variable of most interest in this study—conservation land
(CL)—was positive and significant in all 3 classifications. All three measures—-General
Public, Recreational, and Wilderness, were positive and significant as expected, but with
different coefficients. General Public Land, the most inclusive category, has a coefficient
of 0.089. This can be translated to mean that a 1 percentage point increase in General
Public Land (from its mean of 13.4% to 14.4%) is associated with an increase of tourism
employment of approximately 0.09 percentage point. Recreational lands had a
coefficient of 0.137, indicating that an increase in recreational lands of 1 percentage point
(from its mean of 1.5% to 2.5%) could lead to an increase of tourism employment of
approximately 0.14 percentage point. Wilderness has a coefficient of 0.38, which means
that an increase of 1 percentage point (from its very low mean of 0.78% to 1.78%) is
associated with an increase of tourism employment of approximately 0.38 percentage
point.
The three classifications of CL—General public lands, recreation lands and
wilderness—have means of 13.4%, 1.5%, and 0.78% respectively. Care must be taken in
comparing the coefficients across these three classifications. Adding one percentage
point to 13.4%—the mean of General public land—to get 14.4%, only leads to a 7.46%
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increase in the amount of general public land. Recreational lands would increase from
1.5% to 2.5%, a 66.7% increase in recreational lands. Adding one percentage point to
wilderness, from 0.78% to 1.78%, would be a 128.2% increase in wilderness land from
its previous level. Wilderness may have the highest coefficient of all three types of lands
(0.38) due to its relative scarcity, and that adding 1 percentage point more than doubles
its percentage.
Another way of illustrating the differences is through the concept of elasticity.
Elasticity is a way of measuring the responsiveness of one variable to a change in
another. Table 3 shows elasticity calculations for the three conservation land variables.
These calculations look at the percent change in tourism employment (its change is
divided by its mean) divided by the percent change in conservation land (its change is
divided by its mean).

Table 3. Elasticity
% change TE
% chance CL
Elasticitv=%ATE
%ACL

GenPub
0.089/8.1 = 1.1%
1/13.4 = 7.46%
1.1/7.46 = 0.147

Recreation
0.137/8.1 = 1.69%
1/1.5 = 66.7%
1.69/66.7 = 0.025

Wilderness
0.38/8.1= 4.69 %
1/0.78 = 128.2%
4.69/128.2 = 0.037

General public land yields the highest elasticity—the percentage change in tourism
employment is highest in comparison to the percentage change in conservation land.
Recreation land yields the lowest elasticity.
However, a policy maker trying to increase the role of tourism in the economy
might want to simply look at the coefficient rather than the elasticity figure. In a
hypothetical county with a total of 1000 acres, 1 percentage point of its land is 10 acres.
Increasing conservation land by 1 percentage point is always 10 acres whether you start
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from a mean of 13.4%, 1.5%, or 0.78%. If allocating land to general public uses,
primarily recreational uses, or wilderness area cost the same (a simplifying assumption),
then a policy maker would want to add to wilderness area to get the most increase in
tourism employment. Adding wilderness area may not be possible, as natural areas
without roads and development are few and far between in many parts of the United
States (which may be, as speculated above, the reason for its high value). Designating
relatively natural areas as parks for recreation may be the next best alternative. A policy
maker must also consider the local conditions rather than simply thinking in terms of
percentage points. Considering the distribution of the costs and benefits of new
conservation land will be critical to its success.

Conclusion
There are limitations in this study's ability to assess the impact of land
conservation on tourism. Landscapes and economies are dynamic, and this study's use of
static data makes it difficult to assess a cause and effect relationship between tourism and
conservation. In addition, data availability dictated that only public lands were assessed.
Land protection has been changing over the last several years, with private parties taking
an ever increasing role. Many private partnerships between landowners and land trusts or
other conservation organization are protecting landscapes through the use of conservation
easements as well as fee ownership (Land Trust Alliance, 2005). However, data on these
new land transactions are scattered and difficult to obtain (Merenlender, 2003). Lands
conserved privately have to possibility to impact tourism, however, we are unable to
assess that impact quantitatively at this time.
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In assessing the correlation of public lands with tourism employment, it must also
be noted that all public lands do not adequately protect biodiversity (Grumbine, 1990).
Public lands are an imperfect representation of biodiversity conservation, however,
formal land protection has been used as an indicator of biodiversity conservation in other
studies (Asafu-adjaye, 2003; MacGillivray, 1993). In addition, certain lands that are
designated for the protection of particularly sensitive species or ecosystem may not be
attractive to tourists or appropriate for tourism and recreation. Outdoor recreation and
tourism development have been identified as a threat to biodiversity in their own right
(Czech et al., 2000) however, the impacts of tourism are minimal when compared to
large-scale landscape conversion (Buckley, 2000). New initiatives in ecotourism show
promise to minimize tourism's impact and increase its ability to contribute to the local
economy and engender community support for protected areas. Ecotourism has the most
potential when conservation interests are part of its planning and design as well as
governments and the tourism industry (Giannecchini, 1993; Ceballos-Lascurain, 2001).
This research does point to a relationship between public conservation lands and
importance of tourism in the local economy. Regional planners may be interested in this
result when planning a community's economic development strategy. The tourism
industry will likely be interested in public land designation as a way to encourage tourism
growth. Conservation groups may use growth in tourism as an economic justification of
designating new conservation lands. While these groups often differ in goals and
strategies, there is potential for greater partnership between tourism industry
representatives, local governments, and conservation organizations, who may have more
mutual interests than they once realized.
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Chapter 3
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS APPLIED TO UNITED STATES PRIVATE LAND
CONSERVATION
Introduction
Land conservation in the United States, once thought to be an activity primarily
undertaken by public agencies, has taken a new direction recently. There is a new wave
of increasing private land conservation challenging the notion that only the government
can protect the environment. Concurrently, conservation biologists and ecosystem
managers are recognizing that public lands alone cannot stem the loss of biodiversity and
that private lands must be included in conservation planning (Merenlender, 2004; Jenkins
et al, 2004; Margules and Pressey, 2000). Activity by land trusts and other private
organizations has increased dramatically over the last couple of decades, both in the
number of land trusts and the amount of land protected (Land Trust Alliance, 2005;
Morrisette, 2001). As of 2005, 37 million acres have been conserved by land trusts and
other private organizations in the United States, up 54 percent from 2000 (Land Trust
Alliance, 2005). More specifically, acres protected by conservation easements by state
and local land trusts (as opposed to all private conservation organizations) increased by
148 percent from 2000 to 2005 (Land Trust Alliance, 2005). A conservation easement is
a non-possessory interest in the land, in which the original owner retains the title to the
land, but certain property rights (usually types of development rights) are transferred to a
private organization or government entity (Morrissette, 2001; Gustanski, 2000). Rapid
growth in the use of conservation easements is transforming the way land is protected,
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focusing efforts on voluntary actions of private landowners in concert with land trusts
and other conservation organizations.
Interdisciplinary effort can be used to assess the impact of land trusts and
conservation easements on biodiversity conservation, provision of ecological goods and
services, and community economic well-being (Merenlender et al. 2004). Understanding
institutional and organizational factors that have contributed to this surge in private land
conservation are an important step towards this goal. New institutional economics, and
particularly the work of Douglass North (1990), can be applied as a framework for
viewing: the recent surge in private land conservation, the formation of new land trusts
and the shifting focus of existing organizations, and the development of conservation
easements as a tool for formally protecting landscapes. This framework shows how
institutions and organizations respond to one another in a continuous feedback cycle,
leading to a dynamic system of institutional change. This study applies North's
framework to help explain the recent surge in private land conservation.

Institutional Analysis
Acheson (1994) and Coase (1998) describe a "new" institutional economics
which explains the formation of institutions, drawing from the fields of political science,
anthropology, and sociology. The new institutional economics explains how a society's
institutions, such as its constitution, legal system, and cultural norms, affect and are
influenced by economic activity (Coase, 1998). Institutional economists describe
institutions as the "rules of the game" created by individuals and groups that are aware of
how the institutional framework in which they live and work greatly influences their
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choices and outcomes. Institutions are often formal or legal rules that can be definitively
enforced, but they can also be informal constraints that are socially enforced. Institutions
serve to constrain people's choices and thus can make the actions of others more
predictable, reduce transactions costs, and help economic actors make choices with more
certainty (North, 1990, p. 6, 27).
Economic models of perfect competition make a number of assumptions
regarding the decision-making of individuals, including that they have perfect
information and zero transaction costs. Coase (1960), Acheson (1994) and North (1990)
among others have pointed out that these assumptions often do not apply in practice. In
cases of market failure, when private markets do not lead to an efficient outcome and
individual decision making does not lead to socially optimal conditions, institutions
become an important part of economic activity. Because institutions make the actions of
others more predictable, they can lower the costs of exchange (Acheson, 1994; Bates,
1994).
Property rights are a key institution to economic activity. Property rights are a
bundle of rights over a resource, determined and assigned by political process (Acheson,
1994). Property rights are almost never fully assigned—some rights are typically retained
by the government and/or community (North, 1990, p.33). In large, impersonal
economies, where exchange is often colored by imperfect information and transaction
costs, state enforcement of property rights contracts is essential to their existance (North,
1990, p.57). Development of property rights will have distributional consequences
(Baland and Platteau, 1998), favoring some individuals and groups over others, and
change to existing property rights systems are often contentious (Acheson, 1994).
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Property rights have been lumped into four major categories (see Berkes et al.,
1989). "Open access" is the absence of well-defined property rights, in which no one is
excluded from use. Ocean fisheries through much of history have operated this way.
"Common property" is when a defined group of users can use the property and exclude
others. Ground water is a resource typically controlled in this way. "State property" is a
situation in which the government owns the resource and controls access and usage, such
as public park lands open for recreation. "Private property" exists where an individual or
organization controls a resource and can exclude others, which exists over much farm and
forest land in the Eastern United States.
Property rights and other institutions shape incentives society members face, and
can define the context in which individuals and organizations undertake certain activities
(North, 1990, p. 4). Douglass North has developed a framework for understanding
institutional formation and change. Organizations, or groups of people bounded by a
common purpose, arise in the context of institutional frameworks. Institutions are the
rules of the game, and organizations are the players (North, 1990, p.4-5). Institutions
determine the pay-offs of certain activities and influence the types of organizations that
form and the accomplishments that are possible to these groups (North, 1993).
Organizations can in turn influence institutions, and change them to better suit the
organization's purposes.
North (1990, p.86-7) describes the following factors involved in institutional
change. Exogenous changes in relative prices lead parties to try to renegotiate contracts
to better take advantage of these new prices. However, they may find that they cannot
change contracts due to existing rules. So they may either react by investing in new skills
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and resources to take advantage of new opportunities provided by the change, or invest
resources into changing the rules so that new contracts can be made. Competition
between organizations can also be an agent of institutional change, inducing
organizations to invest in new knowledge and skills. So not only do institutional
frameworks determine what types of organizations will form, they also help dictate what
skills and knowledge organizations will need to succeed. Organizations in turn may use
their resources to work for institutional change. See Figure 5 for a diagram based on
North's framework of institutional change. Arrows represent influence that one factor
exerts on the formation of another. For instance, transactions costs may encourage the
formation of property rights, and organizations such as firms may encourage changes in
the institutions (rules).
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Figure 5. Representation of North's Framework of Institutional Change

Market failure
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Institutions
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Organizations
(firms,
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Market Failure in Conservation Land Provision
Before launching into a description of the institutional and organizational aspects of
private land conservation, a look at the market failures associated with land conservation
is illustrative. Many benefits supplied by conservation land are public goods, and
recognizing the market failures associated with public goods is helpful in overcoming
barriers to their provision. Market failures will lead to an under provision of public
goods, as individual decision makers will not account for benefits others receive in their
choices.
Goods can be seen on a spectrum from public to private. Four major types of goods
are explained by Ostrom and Ostrom (1977) and their classification and some examples
are shown in Figure 6. The place that a good occupies on this spectrum has implications
for the type of organization best suited to provide that good. Private goods will most
optimally be provided by firms in market settings, due to the ability to charge money and
exclude those who do not pay. The pure public good (ie. weather forecasts) will benefit
everyone, and the enjoyment by one does not detract from the enjoyment of another. The
presence of a public good will lead rational individuals to "free-ride" or enjoy the benefit
with out paying. Individuals receive the benefit with or with out paying, and free-riders
will opt out of paying (Bates, 1994). Governments, which possess the ability to coerce
people to pay through the use of taxes, have typically been the major providers of public
goods. However, it is now being recognized that private organizations with strong
leaders that can use selected incentives and/or sanctions can be public good providers
(Bates, 1994). Certain groups stand to benefit from institutional change and provision of
public goods and can organize and influence others to contribute leading to "collective
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action" solutions (Paavola and Adger, 2005). These collective action groups often take
the form of associations which provide benefits to people that join (Acheson, 1994).
There are an increasing number of creative types of public-private partnerships in public
goods provision (Ostrom and Ostrom, 1977).

Figure 6. Types of Goods
(from Ostrom and Ostrom, 1977, p. 78, Fig 3.1)

Jointnevs of Use or Consumption
Alternative Use

Feasible
Exclusion

Infeasible
Exclusion

Joint Use

Private good: bread,
shoes, automobiles,
haircuts, books, etc.

Toll good: Theatre.
night club, telephone
service, toll road, cable
TV, electric power

Common pool resource:
water pumped from a
ground water basin, fish
taken from an ocean,
crude oil extracted from
an oil field

Public good: peace and
security, national
defense, mosquito
abatement, fire
protection, weather
forecasts, "public'' TV"

Common pool resources (ie. water pumped from a ground water basin) are those
that are used by a collection of individuals in which they are all removing flow resources
for their own private gain, but a stock of resources is in theory maintained for the
continuation of use. Difficulty of exclusion can make common pool resources subject to
over-exploitation and degradation, although new research indicates that many
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communities overcome these problems with local based rules and organizations (Ostrom,
1990).
Many aspects of conservation lands have been described as public goods.
Biodiversity conservation can be seen as a "pure" public good, whose benefits accrue
globally, but costs are borne locally, making the incentive to supply even less than other
public goods (Asafu-adjaye, 2003; Pearce and Moran, 1994, p. 43). Pearce and Moran,
(1994, p. 83-115) give an overview of methods of evaluating benefits of sustainable uses
of biodiversity, including indirect use and non-use values as well as conventional direct
uses such as forest products, agriculture and tourism. They use this framework to suggest
ways governments or NGO's may alter incentives facing private landowners in their
decision-making to account for the benefits of biodiversity conservation (Pearce and
Moran, 1994).
Another good associated with some conservation lands is tourism and recreational
access. Vail and Hultkrantz (2000) describe recreational access as an "impure public
good" and describe the situation in Maine one where landowners have limited ability to
exclude tourists due to incompletely defined property rights, and tourists can use land
jointly, but impose costs on other users in the form of congestion. Maine has an informal
open land tradition, supported in part by state laws, that encourage recreationalists to
view private land as a common pool resource (Acheson, 2006). This traditional access is
under threat, as tourism demand increases and landowners are seeing tourists as imposing
higher costs on them. Conservation easements by land trusts have increased significantly
in recent years to help encourage landowners to keep their lands open to the public for
recreation (Acheson, 2006).
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Other examples of public goods from conservation lands include watershed
protection, scenic landscapes, open space, carbon sequestration and climate stabilization.
Many aspects of conservation land contain a mix of goods with public and private
aspects. For instance, conservation lands that allow forestry with sustainable certification
involve production of private goods (forest products), and some public benefits in the
form of wildlife habitat, community economic benefits of forestry, and scenic quality.
Economic benefits derived from tourism on conservation lands may be realized by a
community. A community that effectively balances forestry with amenity and
recreational values may have greater economic growth and stability than areas that rely
chiefly on timber production (Bowe and Marcouiller, 2004). Economic growth and
stability have some of the attributes of public goods, such as infeasibility of exclusion.
The public goods nature of many aspects of conservation lands can be considered
the market failures that have made government institutions such as public land ownership
the primary methods of conservation land provision.

Private Land Conservation
Many non-governmental organizations have been able to overcome barriers to
public goods provision and become major players in land conservation. Looking at
changing circumstances and relative prices, and institutional change, can illustrate how
private land conservation has grown as much as it has.
Land conservation in the United States has historically relied heavily on public
agencies designating lands as parks or reserves, or enacting regulations that restrict the
rights of private landowners (Merenlender et al., 2004). Public conservation lands result
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in a state property rather than a private property situation. Some criticism of public
ownership is that it removes the land base from the tax roles, decreasing the revenue to
the local community and in some cases alienates the local community (Merenlender et
al., 2004). Increasing land prices in some parts of the U. S. increase the cost of public
ownership (Ando et al. 1998).
Government regulation (a separate method from land ownership of conserving
ecosystems and species) can restrict development of private landowners around areas
such as habitat of endangered species, shorelines, or wetlands. In this way, the state has
been an effective provider of the public good (Morrisette, 2001). These regulations have
often been very contentious as such institutional change takes away some property rights
previously available to private land owners, who have a vested interest in organizing to
oppose the rule change. Both government acquisition and regulation have been widely
used in United States land conservation history, and can be credited with much success,
but are increasingly coming under attack due to high costs and threats to private property
rights (Merenlender et al., 2004).
The belief that environmental protection can only be provided by public action is
widespread, and many feel there is an inherent tension between the actions of individuals
and the public good (Morrisette, 2001). Much of the literature on institutions and
common pool resources indicates that there are many circumstances in which private
actors coordinate their efforts to protect the environment and common pool resources
(Morrisette, 2001; Ostrom, 1990). In this manner, collective action can overcome
barriers to public goods provision, and non-governmental organizations and individuals
can be effective providers of environmental public goods.
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Many trends indicate the future of land conservation efforts will be played out
increasingly on private lands (Morrisette, 2001; Land Trust Alliance, 2005; Merenlender
et al., 2004). Land conservation by private organizations has seen a dramatic increase in
recent years, taking an unprecedented and ever increasing role (Land Trust Alliance,
2005). Land trusts and other related conservation organizations are growing in number,
size and stature. The Land Trust Alliance defines a land trust as a "non-profit
organization that, as all or part of its mission, actively works to conserve land by
undertaking or assisting in land or conservation easement acquisition, or by its
stewardship of such land or easements" (Land Trust Alliance, 2005). Figure 7 shows the
growth in the number of land trusts from 1950 to the present.
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Figure 7. Growth in the Number of Land Trusts (1950-2005)

(From Land Trust Alliance, 2005)
Conservation easements are the fastest growing private conservation technique
employed by private agents. As of 2005, 6,245,969 acres have been protected by state
and local land trusts with easements, up 148% from 2000 (Land Trust Alliance, 2005).
See Figure 8 for trends in land conservation. Note that this figure includes land protected
by state and local land trusts only, therefore covers a small percentage of total
conservation easements. When land protected by national conservation organizations is
included, LTA estimates the total acreage protected by private means (easements and
other methods combined) as 37 million in 2005, up 54 percent from 2000 (Land Trust
Alliance, 2005). The Nature Conservancy (TNC), a non-profit organization whose
mission is to protect biodiversity has been using conservation easements since 1961.
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Figure 8. Private Land Conservation by Local and State Land Trusts
Private Land Conservation by Local and State Land Trusts
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(From Land Trust Alliance, 2005)
However, growth in TNC's use of conservation easements has increased from
645,000 acres in 1997 to more than 2 million by 2003 (The Nature Conservancy, 2003).

North's Framework and Private Conservation Growth
North's framework is applied to the increase in United States private land
conservation in Figure 9. Details of the institutional and organizational changes
illustrated briefly in Figure 9 will be explained in detail below.
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Figure 9. North's Framework and Private Land Conservation

5. Institutions:
2031(c) of Taxpayer Relief
Act (1997), influenced by
conservation organizations

3. Institutions:
Many states pass statutes
to allow conservation
easements

1. Institutions:
private property,
tax code section 170(h)

2. Organizations:
Existing land trusts
and conservation groups
try out new tax code

4. Organizations:
New land trusts form,
old conservation groups
invest in new skills

6. Organizations:
Continue to grow in number and
use of conservation easements,
invest resources in influencing
new tax legislation
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A change in the IRS tax code in 1976 has been identified to be largely responsible
for the surge in private land conservation (Small, 2000). The Tax Reform Act of 1976
allowed easement donations of conservation or historical nature to be deducted from an
individual's income tax as a charitable donation. A conservation easement is a nonpossessory interest in the land, in which the original owner retains the title to the land, but
certain property rights (usually types of development rights) are transferred to a private
organization or government entity (Morrissette, 2001; Gustanski, 2000). This easement
provision in the 1976 Tax Reform Act passed Congress with little debate, and little notice
was taken until 1980, when the statute was amended and made permanent. In 1980 the
US. House and Senate committees only reported that they expected to lose about $5
million a year in income tax revenue (Small, 2000). This action is seen as stage 1 on
Figure 9—the institutional change that tipped the balance leading to a series of changes.
A few conservation interest groups, including The Nature Conservancy (TNC),
Trust for Public Land (TPL), and American Farmland Trust (AFT), had become involved
in the Congressional debates on the 1980 statute, and in 1983 when the Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking on Section 170(h) (the easement provision) was released, there
was some confusion among land trusts and other conservation groups as to how these
easements would work (Small, 2000). However, some land trusts and landowners tried
out this new tax incentive, and due to a series of favorable letter rulings from the IRS on
170(h) and several positive court cases that upheld challenges to the easements,
landowners and land trusts began gaining confidence in the legitimacy of this tax
provision to help advance private land conservation (Small, 2000). In Figure 9, this is the
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first organizational shift (stage 2) as organizations begin to respond to institutional
change.
To enact conservation easements in the most advantageous manner, a variety of
state statutes had to be changed to eliminate common law impediments, to allow
conservation easements to be described as real property interests, and to enable non-profit
organizations to own easements. Users of conservation easements have considerable
flexibility in drafting documents. A conservation easement document is specifically
tailored to the priorities of the landowner and the organization owning the easement. In
drafting an easement, organizations and individuals are negotiating new rules and
dividing property rights of a particular piece of land, tying this new institutional
arrangement with the land in perpetuity in most cases. Essentially it is dividing a bundle
of property rights that were once entirely private, into a combination of private and state
ownership (or private and communal ownership in the case of the easement held by a
non-profit entity). The common law of most states did not allow negative easements
(preventing the landowner from undertaking certain activities) to be held in gross
(benefiting the public good, rather than simply an adjacent piece of property)
(Morriesette, 2001).
Since laws concerning land are based on state statutes and court cases (Marchetti
and Cosgrove, 2000) more institutional change was necessary before the use of
conservation easements could become widespread. A few states already had legislation
that enabled conservation easements prior to 1976. Other states began to pass statutes
eliminating some of their common law impediments to conservation easements as land
trusts and landowners began trying them out and they started showing up in courtrooms
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(Morrissette, 2001). State statutes vary a great deal in terminology, types of restrictions
and other aspects. In 1981, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws created the Uniform Conservation Easement Act (UCEA). UCEA was designed as
a model for states in enacting statutes, and many states used this, creating greater
uniformity among state statutes. UCEA enables contracting parties to place restrictions
and obligations on real property, allows them to become perpetual and therefore take
advantage of the tax deduction, and enables non-profit organizations to hold easements
(Gustanski, 2000). Most states using UCEA modified it to reflect their unique situations
to some degree. Most states require the organizations that hold easements to have
conservation as all part of their mission (Mayo, 2000) to prevent organizations forming
simply to help landowners to secure tax breaks (Morrisette, 2001).
Currently, 46 states have conservation easement statutes. Gustanski and Squires
(2000) contains a detailed, state by state account of circumstances and changes that
occurred to allow easement enabling statutes to pass. They also describe many case
studies in which the entrepreneurial spirit of land trusts stretched and pulled the laws to
conserve land in new and creative ways (Gustanski, 2000). State institutions in place
were altered due to new federal tax incentives and the desire of land trusts, landowners,
and the public at large to take advantage of them and ensure that state courts would
uphold the conservation easements. Since laws concerning land are based on state
statutes and court cases, states vary considerably in the way that they treat conservation
easements. Each state has its own unique story about how existing legislation, political
will, public attitudes, activism by conservation organizations, formation of new land
trusts, and/or the simply the successful use of conservation easements contributed to
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successful enactment of state statutes (Gustanski and Squires, 2000). Interactions
between existing institutions, courts, conservation organizations, landowners, and the
public contributed to institutional change to varying degrees across states, and variations
in state statutes can be attributed to variations in these institutions, organizations, and
other circumstances. Stages 3 and 4 of Figure 9 represent the interplay between changing
state statutes and growing organizations.
In 1997, under the Clinton administration, section 2031(c) was added to the tax
code, allowing land under conservation easements to be subject to a reduction in the
estate tax. This new tax incentive for conservation easements can be traced back to
action by the Piedmont Environmental Council, whose advocacy helped to bring the
American Farm and Ranch Protection Act to Congress (Small, 2000). Eventually a
modified version became part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. Certain restrictions
are a part of this new estate tax provisions, the most noteworthy being that easements
must be donated and perpetual (Small, 2000). This additional incentive is now often
considered in the easement planning process, and land trusts are becoming familiar with
this new tax incentive (Squires, 2000). See stage 5 of Figure 9.
In addition to new land trusts forming, older land trusts and conservation
organizations are investing in new skills and strategies. A browse through the "job
opportunities" page of the Land Trust Alliance shows an increasing need for people with
knowledge of real estate and tax law (Land Trust Alliance, 2007a). Organizations such
as TNC, TPL, and AFT have been increasing their use of conservation easements to
achieve their goals (The Nature Conservancy, 2003, Morrisette, 2001). The New
England Forestry Foundation (NEFF), owners of a "working forest" conservation
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easement of 762, 192 acres in Maine, provides an interesting example of organizational
change. NEFF was established in 1944 to provide forest management services to New
England landowners, and later added conservation and education to its mission. In 1994,
it began to increase its land conservation activities (New England Forestry Foundation,
2006a), and in 1999 announced the terms of this new "Pingree Forest Partnership
Project" which included the largest conservation easement in the United States at the time
(New England Forestry Foundation, 2006b).
Networking and information sharing also seems to be a new focus for land trusts
and conservation organizations. The Land Trust Alliance (LTA) in 1981 experienced
rapid growth and success, thanks in part to section 170(h) of the tax code (Small, 2000).
LTA provides trainings and conferences, information on policies and upcoming
legislation, professional resources and information on tax laws, job posting from land
trusts nationwide, and a 5-year census of land trusts (Land Trust Alliance, 2005). On a
smaller scale, the Maine Land Trust Network (MLTN) was established in 1995 to serve
as a hub of information and to build capacity among land conservation organizations
working in the state (Maine Land Trust Network, 2007).
Some of the larger, national organizations are working on pushing institutional
change. TNC, one of the organizations involved in the original tax legislation becoming
permanent in 1980, recently released a legislative proposal to Congress that encouraged
changes in conservation easement laws that would strengthen them and help end abuses
(The Nature Conservancy, 2005). LTA's website encourages land trusts to "Share Your
Story" by sending stories of successful conservation easements that they will compile and
send to Congress (Land Trust Alliance, 2007b). This is designed to encourage Congress
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to make permanent a temporary expansion in conservation easement tax incentives
introduced in 2006, that allows easement donators to deduct larger proportions of their
income from taxes, and allows them a longer period of time to claim deductions. These
are just a couple of examples of the ways organizations are pushing for institutional
change, and investing in skills and knowledge to help them do so, represented as stage 6
in Figure 9. This cycle shows potential to continue in a similar manner as organizations
are currently weighing in on the above mentioned temporary tax incentive, and the
growth in land trusts and conservation easements continues to grow.

Conclusion
Private land conservation is growing rapidly, resulting in many new partnerships
between conservation groups and private landowners. It is perhaps too soon to conclude
what the long term impact of the new private land conservation will be. A review of the
literature reveals much excitement around the growth and success of land trusts and
conservation easements. The flexibility permitted in designing easements has been
described as a benefit, as conservation priorities can reflect needs of the local community
and gain more support (Land Trust Alliance, 2005). "Niche diversification" of a land
trust whose conservation goals (and therefore easements) are tailored to the local
community can help the land trust gain support, donations, and to mitigate the "freerider" problem (Albers and Ando, 2003). However, there can be certain inefficiencies to
having too many land trusts, as many benefits that could occur due to coordination are
too costly, and each land trust may not account for all of the public benefits of its
activities in its' decision making, leading to socially inefficient outcomes (Albers and
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Ando, 2003). Data on land trusts and conservation easements is scattered and difficult to
obtain, and the distribution of costs and benefits is widely unknown (Merenlender et al.
2003). However, networking organizations, such as LTA and MLN appear to mitigate
some of the challenges of coordination that come with the rise in land trust numbers.
Some organizations fear that cases of abuse of conservation easements will
weaken their credibility, and others fear that successors to land will challenge
conservation easements in court. In 2003, the IRS the U.S. Senate Finance Committee
conducted an inquiry into The Nature Conservancy and many of its conservation
easement practices, uncovering some questionable land transactions (Stephens and
Ottaway, 2003a). The IRS has also been subjecting select easements to greater scrutiny
in an attempt to crack down on abuses (Stephens and Ottaway, 2004). TNC has been
responsive to allegations of abuse by reforming some of its conservation easement
practices (Stephens and Ottaway, 2003b), and in encouraging stronger tax laws to end
abuses.
In spite of instances of abuse, however, private conservation is increasing
exponentially, and is expected to continue to grow. Private conservation is not a
replacement for public land ownership, but often is seen as a complement to it. The new
emphasis on eco-system management by conservation biologists and federal land
managers increasingly emphasizes organizational change, economic considerations, and
collaborative decision-making (Grumbine, 1997; Imperial, 1999, among others).
Merenlender et al. (2004) stress the importance of understanding the diversity of
conservation organizations, how private organizations work with government agencies,
and what the most effective organizational arrangements are for land conservation in
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various settings. This analysis explains how institutional factors have influenced the
organizations that have recently given great force to private conservation. Understanding
the institutional factors that give rise to private land conservation and the resulting
institutional change will lend some insight to the ongoing pursuit of the most effective
organizational arrangements for land conservation.
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Chapter 4
CONCLUSION
Both public and private land conservation in the United States have been
examined. An econometric analysis has uncovered an association between public lands
and tourism employment. Results suggest more collaboration between the tourism
industry and land management agencies and conservation groups may be appropriate. A
qualitative analysis using new institutional economic theories has given insight into the
surge in private land conservation. A greater understanding of the institutional factors
that encourage different kinds of conservation organizations and influence the activities
they undertake advances the multi-disciplinary work that is increasingly seen as
necessary to the future of ecosystem management and biodiversity conservation.
There is an increasing emphasis on ecosystem-based management in public land
agencies and academic research. Emerging themes in ecosystem-based management
include the need to view ecological problems in a political, social and economic context,
and the importance of data from the social sciences in making management decisions
(Grumbine, 1997). Transforming organizations, developing partnerships with public and
private interests, and forming networks are also important to ecosystem management
(Grumbine, 1997). Nonprofit organizations and private firms are increasingly becoming
partners with government agencies in natural resource decisions, rather than advocates
and opponents (Imperial, 1999). Keough and Blahna (2006) describe a set of case studies
in which ecosystem management approaches have been successfully implemented,
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largely due to the use of multi-disciplinary data and the integration of social, economic,
and ecological goals.
Ongoing experiments and research in ecosystem-based management will surely
continue to refine knowledge, challenge assumptions, and test the limits of a multidisciplinary approach. This study contributes to this emerging effort to effectively
integrate society's goals of conserving natural ecosystems and biodiversity with its desire
to continue to develop economic well being.
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Appendix A
Group Logit Results
In Essay I, a Spatial Error Model (SEM) was chosen due to: the use of county level data,
similar studies that account for spatial autocorrelation, and testing that showed that a
SEM was a good fit for the data. However, typically a logistic functional form is
recommended for a dependent variable that is a proportion or fraction (Kennedy, 2003).
A logistic form could not be used in conjunction with a SEM, but has been provided here
for comparison. In a logistic model, estimates of the dependent variable will remain
bounded between zero and one. A group logit model was used, in which the counties are
considered the groups. Each county is weighted by its total number of employed
workers. Results are presented here for three group logit models on three measures of
conservation lands. Coefficients and marginal effects have been converted from
proportion to percentage. Marginal effects can be compared with SEM coefficients, as
they represent the effect on the dependent variable of a one unit increase in the
independent variable.

56

Table Al. Group Logit Results for General Public Lands
Variable
Constant
General Public Land
Coast
Water
Tablelands
Plains and Hills
Open Hills/Mountains
Hills and Mountains
January Sun
July Temp
July Humidity
P/MSA
Pop Density
Interstate
Airport
Pseudo R-squared

Coefficient
-108.07
(-91.835)
0.184
(76.125)
-2.76
(-21.387)
0.155
(61.088)
5.203
(37.13)
-19.248
(-115.52)
2.51
(21.342)
6.188
(41.64)
-0.125
(-59.702)
-1.548
(-114.247)
-0.204
(-36.018)
0.098
(69.833)
0.00096
(135.028)
4.36
(42.805)
19.248
(212.217)
0.571

Marginal Effect
-8.582
(-91.821)
0.015
(76.136)
-0.218
(-21.454)
0.012
(61.096)
0.421
(36.49)
-1.43
(-123.844)
0.2
(21.208)
0.5
(40.934)
-0.01
(-59.708)
-0.12
(-114.274)
-0.016
(-36.018)
0.0078
(69.838)
0.00008
(135.125)
0.342
(43.338)
1.579
(205.709)

All variables are significant at the 1% level. Values in parenthesis are t statistics.
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Table A2. Group Logit Results for Recreational Lands
Variable
Constant
Recreational Land
Coast
Water
Tablelands
Plains and Hills
Open Hills/Mountains
Hills and Mountains
January Sun
July Temp
July Humidity
P/MSA
Pop Density
Interstate
Airport
Pseudo R-squared

Coefficient
-112.365
(-94.74)
0.154
(37.05)
-2.56
(-19.81)
0.175
(69)
5.822
(41.65)
-18.22
(-109.78)
3.264
(27.875)
8.46
(58.33)
-0.104
(-50.01)
-1.52
(-111.25)
-19.611
(-34.52)
0.111
(79.73)
0.001
(139.12)
4.656
(45.72)
19.64
(216.9)
0.571

Marginal Effect
-8.92
(-94.72)
0.012
(37.05)
-0.203
(-19.86)
0.014
(69.01)
0.472
(40.85)
-1.36
(-117.25)
0.261
(27.65)
0.688
(56.99)
-0.008
(-50.02)
-0.12
(-111.28)
-0.016
(-34.52)
0.009
(79.74)
0.0001
(139.21)
0.365
(46.33)
1.612
(210.11)

All variables are significant at the 1% level. Values in parenthesis are t statistics.
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Table A3. Group Logit Results for Wilderness Areas
Variable
Constant
Wilderness Area
Coast
Water
Tablelands
Plains and Hills
Open Hills/Mountains
Hills and Mountains
January Sun
July Temp
July Humidity
P/MSA
Pop Density
Interstate
Airport
Pseudo R-squared

Coefficient
-119.75
(-102.25)
0.388
(58.17)
-2.54
(-19.67)
0.183
(73.42)
5.794
(41.45)
-18.14
(-109.45)
3.269
(27.91)
7.47
(50.98)
-0.105
(-50.68)
-1.45
(-107)
-0.16
(-28.15)
0.111
(79.45)
0.001
(140.95)
4.85
(47.57)
19.29
(212.48)
0.571

Marginal Effect
-9.51
(-102.23)
0.031
(58.17)
-0.2
(-19.72)
0.015
(73.43)
0.469
(40.65)
-1.353
(-116.86)
0.262
(27.69)
0.606
(49.94)
-0.008
(-50.68)
-0.115
(-107.02)
-0.013
(-28.15)
0.009
(79.46)
0.0001
(141.05)
0.38
(48.23)
1.582
(205.95)

All variables are significant at the 1 % level. Values in parenthesis are t statistics.
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Figure B l . Tourism W o r k e r s

Appendix B
Map of Total Tourism Workers
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